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INTRODUCTION
National court involvement in international arbitration is a fact of
life as prevalent as the weather. National courts become involved in
arbitration for a whole host of reasons, but do so primarily because
national laws are permissive and parties invite or encourage them to
do so. 1 But what is the nature of such involvement? Does it
complement or impede the arbitration process? Is there a place for
any court involvement at all in the system referred to as international
arbitration?
The aim of this Article is to discuss these issues. First, this Article
will discuss the fundamental characteristics of international
arbitration as it co-exists with national courts. Next, this Article will
survey the different stages of national court involvement in the
international arbitration process and the forms of court involvement.
Further, this Article will analyze court awarded injunctions that act
to support of the international arbitration process. Lastly, this Article
will conclude with an assessment of whether court involvement is
helpful to the international arbitration process.

I. FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
There are four essential characteristics of international arbitration.
First, international arbitration has an autonomous character and
exists in a domain independent of and separate from national laws

1. See Richard Allan Horning, Interim Measures of Protection; Security for
Claims and Costs; and Commentary on the WIPO Emergency Relief Rules (in
Toto): Article 46, 9 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 155, 156 (1998) (supporting the use of
arbitration by contracting parties because of the simplicity, lower cost, stability,
and binding nature of the process).
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and jurisdictions. 2 Arbitration does not, as some have suggested,
operate solely on the basis of contract, or from the relinquishment of
jurisdictional control by states, or even a combination of these two
things. Instead, arbitration is an autonomous system with a life of its
own that inhabits a domain wholly outside any system of national
law. 3 Access to the autonomous domain of international arbitration is
obtained through contract and the relinquishment of rights by
national courts. However, once entered, and subject to controls as
discussed later, arbitration exists in its own rarefied domain.
Secondly, by their choice of arbitration parties have expressed a
positive selection of an alternative dispute resolution system. 4 This is
so even when national law has been chosen as the substantive law of
the contract or the curial law of the arbitration. More specifically, the
parties have intentionally and expressly rejected the jurisdiction of
those courts. Parties make this choice for various reasons, such as
the national courts’ being unacceptable, unsuitable, or inappropriate
in the circumstances of the case. 5 Regardless of their reasons, the
parties have agreed the courts should take a back seat. The question
is how far back the courts should be and when the courts should
come forward.
Third, except in rare circumstances, the arbitral tribunal has
primary responsibility for resolving all matters relating to the
settlement of the dispute between the parties. 6 Through the principle
of “separability,” the agreement to arbitrate can survive even where
2. See generally Julian D M Lew QC, Achieving the Dream: Autonomous
Arbitration? in ARBITRATION INSIGHTS, 455, 455-85 (Julian D.M. Lew & Loukas
A. Mistelis eds., 2007) [hereinafter Lew, Achieving the Dream] (discussing the
“dream” of international arbitration as its existence in its own private non-national
sphere, and the “nightmare” as anti-arbitration injunctions, which are designed to
protect the nationals of the issuing court).
3. See Lew, supra note 2, at 457.
4. See Horning, supra note 1, at 156.
5. See id. at 156-57 (listing reasons why parties choose arbitration over
national courts, which include the avoidance of arbitrary jury decisions, the ability
to command the attention of knowledgeable decision makers, and the final and
binding character of any decision).
6. Cf. Stephen M. Ferguson, Interim Measures of Protection in International
Commercial Arbitration: Problems, Proposed Solutions, and Anticipated Results,
CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J., Winter 2003, at 55, 59 (stating that the support for
ordering ex parte interim measures is derived from the fact that resolving disputes
is a necessary component of arbitration).
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the underlying agreement may be in doubt or found to be invalid or
illegal. 7 Through the principle of “competence-competence,” the
arbitral tribunal is entitled, if not duty bound, to determine its own
jurisdiction. 8 These principles are by and large now widely
recognized.
Fourth, despite the autonomous nature of arbitration, it must be
recognized that just as no man or woman is an island, so no system
of dispute resolution can exist in a vacuum. Without prejudice to
autonomy, international arbitration does regularly interact with
national jurisdictions for its existence to be legitimate and for
support, help, and effectiveness. 9 This assistance of the national
courts takes on different forms at different stages of the arbitration
process because: (1) national laws are required to recognize and
enforce the agreement to arbitrate and enforce any award; 10
(2) national laws are required to support the arbitration process
during the arbitration; 11 and (3) international arbitration has
established certain fundamental standards that require policing at the
national level. 12 These standards are recognized by the international
community and reflected in international instruments, international
public policy and due process. 13

7. See Tanya J. Monestier, “Nothing Comes of Nothing”… Or does It??? A
Critical Re-Examination of the Doctrine of Separability in American Arbitration,
12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 223, 224 (2001) (discussing the Supreme Court decision
in Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395 (1967), where the Court
recognized that arbitration clauses are separable from the contract in which they
are contained).
8. See Monestier, supra note 7, at 243-44 (citing First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995)).
9. See William W. Park, The Lex Loci Arbitri and International Commercial
Arbitration, 32 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 21, 30 (1983).
10. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards art. III, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention] (requiring all
contracting states to recognize arbitral awards as binding).
11. See id. art. II, § 3 (stating that the court of the contracting state shall, in the
case of parties who have signed an agreement and at the request of one of the
parties, refer disputes to arbitration).
12. See Park, supra note 9, at 23 (explaining that an arbitrator must bow to
some of the “mandatory norms of the country in which he sits”).
13. See, e.g., id. at 28 (discussing the nature of enforcement and the effect that
the New York Convention has on the relationship of arbitration to the nation in
which it occurs).
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In this overall scheme international arbitration can be envisaged as
a giant squid which seeks nourishment from the murky oceanic world
where the domain of international arbitration and national
jurisdiction meet. One might therefore speak of the international
arbitration process as stretching its tentacles down from the domain
of international arbitration to the national legal systems to forage for
legitimacy, support, recognition, and effectiveness.

II. FORMS OF COURT INVOLVEMENT
With these four characteristics as the backdrop, this Section will
discuss the most common forms of court involvement with
international arbitration. Before doing that, however, it is appropriate
to remember the requirements under the New York Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the
“New York Convention”), which has now been ratified by 144
countries. 14 The Convention provides that: (1) each contracting state
must “recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties
undertake to submit to arbitration . . . concerning a subject matter
capable of settlement by arbitration”; 15 (2) courts of contracting
states, when dealing with a case in which there is a valid arbitration
agreement, must “at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties
to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void,
inoperative, or incapable of being performed”; 16 (3) each Contracting
State, when dealing with a case in which there is a valid arbitration
agreement, must “recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce
them in accordance with the rules of . . . the territory where the
award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in” the
Convention; 17 and (4) the court at the place where enforcement of an
award is sought can refuse recognition and/or enforcement of such an
award only in specified limited circumstances. These limited
circumstances include the invalidity of the arbitration agreement,
lack of notice of the arbitration, that the subject matter of the award
14. See Status: 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/
arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2009) (listing the
names and ratification dates of all 143 States Parties).
15. New York Convention, supra note 10, art. II, § 1.
16. Id. art. II, § 3.
17. Id. art. III.
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is not a difference contemplated by the arbitration agreement, or that
the composition of the tribunal or the procedure followed was
contrary to that agreed by the parties. 18
A close reading of Articles II, III and V of the New York
Convention reveals two crucial principles of international arbitration.
First, court involvement is required as support for the arbitral process
and for recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements and
awards but nothing else. 19 In this context, any other national court
involvement in the international arbitration process is arguably
illegitimate, including actions to protect nationals of a particular
country, to intimidate arbitrators, to protect national commercial or
jurisdictional interests, or simply because the court thinks that it is
better suited than an arbitral tribunal to decide on an issue.
Second, the only courts that should become involved in the
arbitration process are those at the seat of arbitration or the place of
enforcement. 20 It is here, as will be seen later in the context of the
use of anti-suit or anti-arbitration injunctions, that the intervention of
the courts conflicts with these accepted international rules. In
addition to these two principles, it is also widely accepted that there
is a hierarchy between the court of the seat of arbitration and the
court of enforcement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
recently expressed this in the following terms: “Under the [New
York] Convention, ‘the country in which, or under the [arbitration]
law of which, [an] award was made’ is said to have primary
jurisdiction over the arbitration award. All other signatory States are
secondary jurisdictions, in which parties can only contest whether
that State should enforce the arbitral award.” 21
18. Id. art. V (adding that courts may refuse to recognize arbitral awards that
are not yet binding or suspended by the competent authority in the country where
the award was granted).
19. Cf. James A. Gaitis, The Federal Arbitration Act: Risks and Incongruities
Relating to the Issuance of Interim and Partial Awards in Domestic and
International Arbitrations, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 54-55 (2005) (discussing
the split in U.S. circuit courts over the authority created statutorily and within the
New York Convention for review of nondomestic awards).
20. See Jan Paulsson, Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration:
When and Why It Matters, 32 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 53, 55 (1983) (stating that the
situs of an arbitration is chosen for its “appropriateness given the context of a
particular case”).
21. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
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The UNCITRAL Model Law, which records what are generally
considered the standards and practices of international arbitration and
the most appropriate national law for international arbitration, 22
contains similar provisions to the New York Convention but is more
expansive as to the role of the courts. 23 Its approach is clearly stated
in its early provisions: Article 5 provides that “no court shall
intervene except where so provided in this Law,” 24 and Article 6
designates just three areas for court involvement in an arbitration
within its jurisdiction. 25 First, it provides for assistance with the
appointment of a tribunal: Articles 11.3, 11.4, 13 and 14 provide for
court assistance to ensure the proper appointment of a tribunal where
the appointing mechanism fails, there is a challenge to the
independence and impartiality of an arbitrator, or an arbitrator
becomes incapable of performing his duties. 26 Second, it allows
review of issues of fundamental jurisdiction: Article 16.3 gives the
court the power to revisit issues concerning the tribunal’s jurisdiction
in light of the terms of the arbitration agreement. 27 Third, it allows
parties to challenge an award: Article 34 provides for those
exceptional conditions where the court may set aside or overturn an
award. 28 Like the New York Convention, these are limited to
Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 364 (5th Cir. 2003), in re Karah Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 465 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
22. See generally U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW
ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION at annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/40/17,
U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2008), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL
LAW]; Noah Rubins, “Manifest Disregard of the Law” and Vacatur of Arbitral
Awards in the United States, 12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 363, 363-64 (2001)
(outlining the problem with creating a clear distinction between domestic and
international arbitration and suggesting that adoption of the UNCITRAL Model
Law could be a solution).
23. See S. I. Strong, Intervention and Joinder as of Right in International
Arbitration: An Infringement of Individual Contract Rights or a Proper Equitable
Measure?, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 915, 975 (1998) (stating that the Model
Law was “intended to help liberalize international commercial litigation by
minimizing the role of domestic courts and by giving full effect to party
autonomy”).
24. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 22, art. 5.
25. Id. art. 6.
26. Id. art. 11, §§ 3-4, art. 13, § 3, art. 14.
27. Id. art. 16, § 3.
28. Id. art. 34.
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whether the issues determined come within the scope of the
arbitration agreement or there has been some procedural irregularity
in the conduct of the arbitration. There is no provision allowing the
national court to review the tribunal’s decision on the merits. Lastly,
Articles 35 and 36 of the Model Law contain almost identical
provisions for the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards as
in the New York Convention. 29

III. THE STAGES AT WHICH COURTS CAN AND
DO BECOME INVOLVED
As is evident from the thumbnail overview of the New York
Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law above, there are four
stages when courts are most likely to become involved with the
arbitration process: (1) prior to the establishment of a tribunal; (2) at
the commencement of the arbitration; (3) during the arbitration
process; and (4) during the enforcement stage. 30

A. PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRIBUNAL
Prior to the establishment of the arbitral tribunal, courts become
involved where a party initiates proceedings to challenge the validity
of the arbitration agreement; where one party institutes court
proceedings despite, and perhaps with the intention of avoiding, the
agreement to arbitrate; and where one party needs urgent protection
that cannot await the appointment of the tribunal.
In all cases, the court’s duty is to uphold the agreement to
arbitrate. In the first and second cases, the court must deal with this
in accordance with the New York Convention, i.e., refer the matter to
arbitration if there is a valid arbitration agreement. 31 Differences
exist between national laws as to what extent the courts can review
the existence of a valid arbitration agreement before the arbitral

29. Compare id., arts. 35-36, with New York Convention, supra note 10, arts.
III, V.
30. See JULIAN D.M. LEW QC ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 367-74 (2003).
31. See New York Convention, supra note 10, art. II, § 1 (mandating that
signatory states recognize “agreement[s] in writing under which the parties
undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen”).
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tribunal has done so. 32 In the third case, the court fills the gap until
the tribunal is established to protect the status quo. Many national
laws allow, as does the UNCITRAL Model Law by omission, for
courts to grant interim relief before the tribunal has been established
or where the applicable arbitration rules do not allow arbitrators to
grant interim measures of protection. 33 Most would agree that, at this
stage, national court intervention is not disruptive, and may be
beneficial to the arbitration proceedings. 34 Exceptionally, this might
not be the case where the requested measures can be postponed, or
the court effectively has to pre-empt the decision of the tribunal.

B. AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ARBITRATION
Court intervention at the commencement of an arbitration
generally involves assisting with the appointment of and challenges
to arbitrators. As is reflected in the UNCITRAL Model Law and in
most national laws, the court here uses its authority to give effect to
the parties’ agreement by establishing an appropriate tribunal to take
over and deal with the dispute between the parties where the
prescribed appointment mechanism does not work. 35

C. DURING THE ARBITRATION PROCESS
Court involvement during the arbitration process comes in many
forms and is rarely dealt with in arbitration statutes. Properly
exercised, this involves courts’ making procedural orders that cannot
be ordered or enforced by arbitrators, or orders for maintaining the
status quo. These measures are generally helpful. 36 There are also
32. See Premium Nafta Prods. Ltd. v. Fili Shipping Co. [2007] UKHL 40, ¶ 19
(U.K.) (holding that English courts will refrain from an overly technical approach
to the determination of the validity of arbitration clauses, and seek to uphold the
agreement to arbitrate wherever this is practically possible).
33. See Lew, Achieving the Dream, supra note 2, at 471-73 (providing
examples of Swiss and Swedish laws that allow courts to provide interim relief, but
limit most or all other forms of intervention).
34. See YVES DERAINS & ERIC A. SCHWARTZ, A GUIDE TO THE ICC RULES OF
ARBITRATION 294-95 (2d ed. 2005).
35. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 22, art. 11, § 5 (requiring that a
court appointing an arbitrator “have due regard to any qualifications required of the
arbitrator by the agreement of the parties”).
36. See generally Griffin v. Semperit of Am., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1384, 1390-91
(S.D. Tex. 1976) (holding that when the scope of an arbitration clause is debatable,
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orders for protecting and taking evidence, or otherwise protecting the
integrity of the arbitration. This type of intervention is generally
unobjectionable and appropriate in circumstances where the tribunal
cannot (rather than has refused to) take the measures sought, and the
intervention has the agreement of the tribunal. 37

D. DURING THE ENFORCEMENT STAGE
Finally after an award has been rendered, the courts may become
involved in two places: (1) at the place of arbitration, i.e., when a
party challenges and seeks to set aside the award, or lodges an appeal
against the award under the applicable arbitral law or regime; or
(2) at the place of enforcement, where the successful party seeks the
recognition and enforcement of the award.
There is one word of caution in all this. Although the principles as
outlined above are normal and desirable, one should be aware that
when a national court is asked to deal with any of these issues, it is in
its simplest form a negation of the arbitration agreement. More
particularly, a national court will inevitably and unsurprisingly
approach and determine these issues in accordance with its own
national law and procedures. More controversially it may also be
influenced by its parochial, legal, cultural, economic, and political
system. 38

IV. INJUNCTIONS INVOLVING ARBITRATION
Granting injunctions is one area of court involvement which cuts
across every stage of the arbitration process and gives rise to a
number of practical and conceptual difficulties. 39 Judge Stephen
the court should hold in favor of the arbitration).
37. See LEW ET AL., supra note 30, at 369-70 (noting the lack of coercive
power held by arbitration tribunals and the need to use courts in the compelling of
witnesses and evidence).
38. See Lew, Achieving the Dream, supra note 2, at 477 (stressing that national
courts should not seek to impose their “narrow national viewpoint and approach in
place of . . . non-national and international process[es]”).
39. See Julian D.M. Lew, Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by National Courts to
Prevent Arbitration Proceedings, in ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 25, 25 (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 2005) [hereinafter Lew, Anti-Suit
Injunctions] (noting that anti-suit injunctions potentially destabilize the
environment surrounding dispute resolution); see also Marco Stacher, You Don’t
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Schwebel described it as “one of the gravest problems of
contemporary international commercial arbitration.” 40 Injunctions
come in all shapes and sizes. The focus here will be on injunctions
that seek to undermine or block arbitration proceedings, i.e., antiarbitration injunctions, and those that encourage and enforce
arbitration proceedings, i.e., anti-suit injunctions and pro-arbitration
injunctions.

A. ANTI-ARBITRATION INJUNCTIONS
Anti-arbitration injunctions are used either before arbitration has
commenced to prevent the tribunal from being established or after
proceedings have begun to stop an arbitration in its tracks.
Injunctions restraining the conduct of arbitration proceedings are in
general—and should only be—granted where it is absolutely clear
that the arbitration proceedings have been wrongly brought. 41 These
injunctions can be directed against the parties alone, but also against
the arbitrators if the court has jurisdiction over them.
In general, there is a distinction between common law countries
and civil law countries when it comes to the power to award antiarbitration injunctions. Common law countries tend to be permissive
and therefore more willing to become involved, while civil law
countries tend to be restrictive and are reluctant to interfere in the
process chosen by the parties. 42 This is not surprising as—at the risk
Want to Go There – Antisuit Injunctions in International Commercial Arbitration,
23 ASA BULL. 640, 652 (2005) (arguing that injunctions imposed by domestic
courts potentially interfere with international legal regimes by implying domestic
skepticism towards the foreign legal scheme and its ability to undertake a treaty in
good faith).
40. Stephen M. Schwebel, Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Arbitration –
An Overview, in ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra
note 39, at 5-6.
41. Cf. DAVID ST. JOHN SUTTON ET AL., RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION § 7-052
(23rd ed. 2007) (noting that in the event a court refuses to stay legal proceedings,
arbitration will not be undertaken in order to solve the dispute).
42. See Julian D M Lew QC, Control of Jurisdiction by Injunctions Issued by
National Courts, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2006: BACK TO BASICS? 185,
201 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2007) [hereinafter Lew, Control of Jurisdiction]
(explaining that under the common law regimes of the United States and England,
a court may only issue an anti-arbitration injunction as a means of shielding its
jurisdiction against a foreign arbitration, while civil law systems, such as France
and Sweden, lack a legal basis for granting anti-arbitration injunctions).
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of gross exaggeration or simplification—common law systems
generally deal with parallel proceedings on a case by case basis by
way of forum non conveniens. Civil law systems however use the lis
alibi pendens principle, i.e., first come first served, and therefore do
not intervene very much.
1. England
In England, for example, courts rely on two statutory provisions to
give them power to award injunctions in the arbitration context:
section 72(1) of the Arbitration Act of 1996 and section 37 of the
Supreme Court Act of 1981. Section 72(1) of the Arbitration Act
provides in pertinent part that: “1. A person . . . who takes no part in
[arbitration] proceedings may question— . . . (c) what matters have
been submitted to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration
agreement, by proceedings in the court for a declaration or injunction
or other appropriate relief.” 43 Section 37 of the Supreme Court Act of
1981 provides:
(1) The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or
final) grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in
which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do
so.
(2) Any such order may be made either unconditionally or on
such terms and conditions as the court thinks just. 44
These provisions were applied in Welex A.G. v. Rosa Maritime
Ltd. (“The Epsilon Rosa”) where an anti-suit injunction was issued
restraining Welex from proceeding with court proceedings in Poland
brought in violation of an arbitration agreement. 45 The Court of
Appeal held that even though the Arbitration Act did not give an
express power to the High Court to grant the injunction, it has a
general power to grant permanent anti-suit injunctions “in all cases in
which it appears to the Court to be just and convenient to do so.” 46
43. Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 72 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.
gov.uk/Acts/acts1996/plain/ukpga_19960023_en_1 (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
44. Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 37 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.
gov.uk/acts/acts1981/PDF/ukpga_19810054_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
45. See Welex A.G. v. Rosa Maritime Ltd. [2003] EWCA (Civ) 938, [34]-[40]
(Eng.).
46. Id. [40].

2009]

NATIONAL COURT INVOLVEMENT

501

This case concerned an appeal against the High Court’s decision to
grant an anti-suit injunction restraining Welex from proceeding with
court proceedings in Poland brought in violation of an arbitration
agreement. The Court of Appeal ruled that even if the Arbitration
Act of 1996 did not give an express power to the High Court to grant
the injunction, such power could be derived from its general power
under section 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act of 1981. 47
Accordingly, it follows that English courts can award antiarbitration injunctions but will only do so in exceptional
circumstances and specifically only where it is clear that the
arbitration proceedings have been wrongly brought. Anti-arbitration
injunctions should not be granted simply because the balance of
convenience favors the injunction. 48 In Compagnie Nouvelle France
Navigation, S.A. v. Compagnie Navale Afrique du Nord, the Court of
Appeal offered the following guidance for granting anti-arbitration
injunctions: first, the order “must not cause injustice to the claimant
in the arbitration;” and second, the applicant for the order “must
satisfy the Court that the continuat[ion] of the arbitration would be
oppressive or vexatious . . . or an abuse of the process of the
Court.” 49
This approach was confirmed in the 2006 case of Weissfisch v.
Julius. 50 In this case, an action was brought before the English High
Court seeking: (1) a declaration that the arbitration agreement
providing for Swiss law and a Swiss arbitral seat was void; and
(2) an injunction restraining the sole arbitrator under the agreement
from acting as arbitrator. The only real connection with England was
the fact that the arbitrator was an English lawyer within the
jurisdiction of the court. The court rejected the application on several
grounds but in particular because the arbitration agreement stated
47. See id.
48. See id. [44]-[45] (noting that in situations falling under the New York
Convention, issues, such as forum non conveniens, are not of significant weight to
influence an anti-arbitration decision, as the Convention does not permit
discretionary application of an arbitration clause).
49. Compagnie Nouvelle France Navigation, S.A. v. Compagnie Navale
Afrique du Nord (1966) 1 Lloyd’s List L.R. 477, 487.
50. Weissfisch v. Julius [2006] EWCA (Civ) 218, [32]-[35] (Eng.)
(recognizing that ultimately the Court should refrain from issuing an injunction, as
the applicant neglected to advance any extenuating circumstances by which the
previously-agreed upon arbitration clause could be deemed overly burdensome).
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expressly that disputes should be resolved by the sole arbitrator, with
his seat in Switzerland and governed by Swiss law, 51 and
consequently, any issues as to the validity of the arbitration
agreement were required “to be resolved in Switzerland according to
Swiss law.” 52 This was not a matter for the English courts.
In J. Jarvis & Sons Ltd. v. Blue Circle Dartford Estates Ltd.,
Jarvis sought a stay of arbitration proceedings on the grounds that
concurrent proceedings would be in place, that existing proceedings
may result in inconsistent findings, and that the arbitration
proceedings serve no useful purpose. 53 The court found that it had
jurisdiction to entertain the application but noted that an order would
only be made in exceptional circumstances. 54 In reaching its decision
refusing an injunction, the court noted the refusal of the Commercial
Court to grant an anti-arbitration injunction in the recent cases of
Intermet FCZO v. Ansol Ltd. and Elektrim S.A. v. Vivendi, and that,
since January 31, 1997, there were apparently no instances of the
Commercial Court’s granting an injunction to halt an arbitration. 55
The court further noted that: (1) it had jurisdiction to make an order
under section 37 of the Supreme Court Act of 1991; (2) the
discretion can be exercised if (a) the injunction does not cause
injustice, and (b) “the continuance of the arbitration would be
oppressive, vexatious, unconscionable or an abuse of process”;
(3) the discretion should be used sparingly given the principles of the
Arbitration Act; and (4) delay would be material, if not fatal, to the
application. 56
A major concern with the possibility of several conflicting
jurisdictions is the risk of inconsistent findings. In this respect, the
court stated:

51. See id. [33].
52. Id.
53. See J. Jarvis & Sons Ltd. v. Blue Circle Dartford Estates Ltd. [2007]
EWHC (TCC) 1262, [19] (Eng.).
54. See id. [21] (noting that Jarvis submitted their claim at a very late stage in
the proceedings, two weeks before the arbitration start date, and as such this factor
would weigh heavily against Jarvis).
55. See id. [39] (citing Elektrim S.A. v. Vivendi Universal S.A. [2007] EWHC
(Comm) 571 (Eng.) and Intermet FCZO v. Ansol Ltd. [2007] EWHC (Comm) 226
(Eng.)).
56. Id. [40].
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Once those proceedings [i.e., court proceedings brought by a
party against Jarvis] have been launched, there will be
concurrent proceedings both in court and before the
Arbitrator concerning the same subject matter. This carries
the risk of inconsistent findings. Costs will be duplicated.
Both Jarvis and Blue Circle will be fighting on two fronts
before different tribunals about the same subject matter.
All of those observations are true, but they do not mean that
the arbitration is vexatious. It is an inevitable consequence of
the mandatory language of section 9 of [the] Arbitration Act
that from time to time there will be concurrent proceedings in
court and before an arbitrator. 57
In Elektrim S.A. v. Vivendi Universal S.A., one of the two cases
addressed in Jarvis, the claimant sought an injunction to restrain the
respondents from pursuing an arbitration being conducted before the
London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”). 58 The claimant
and the first and second respondents were shareholders in a joint
venture company which controlled the Polish company which ran the
largest mobile telecommunications network in Poland. A dispute had
arisen between the claimant and respondent under an investment
agreement to which they were parties and under which the second
respondent had begun an arbitration in London under the rules of the
LCIA.
There had been other arbitrations and court proceedings between
the parties. A draft agreement to settle the ownership of the shares in
the Polish company and all outstanding proceedings was produced.
It provided for disputes to be submitted to arbitration in Geneva in
accordance with the International Chamber of Commerce rules. The
second respondent claimed that a legally binding settlement had been
concluded and began an arbitration in Geneva claiming a declaration
that the settlement agreement was binding and enforceable. To avoid
the risk of several proceedings and possibly inconsistent and
conflicting decisions, the claimant sought an injunction to restrain
the LCIA arbitration until after the final determination of the Geneva
arbitration. The London arbitrators had refused the claimant’s
request that they stay the arbitration.

57. Id. [45]-[46].
58. See Elektrim, [2007] EWHC 571 (Comm) [1].
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In refusing the injunction to restrain the LCIA proceedings, the
court reasoned, first, that under the Arbitration Act, “the scope for
the court to intervene by injunction before an award” had been “very
limited.” 59 Second, neither the existence of the London arbitration
nor its prosecution breached any legal or equitable right of the
claimant. The parties had agreed to resolve disputes under the
investment agreement by LCIA arbitration. 60 The pursuit of two
arbitrations with different subject-matters was not vexatious or
oppressive. Third, even if the claimant could establish that some
right had been infringed or was threatened by the continuation of the
London arbitration or that continuation of the arbitration was
otherwise vexatious or oppressive, the court would not grant an
injunction under section 37 of the 1981 Act because that would be
contrary to the parties’ agreement to refer disputes under the
investment agreement to LCIA arbitration. 61 The arbitrators had on
three occasions refused to stay the LCIA arbitration and the court
had “no express power under the Arbitration Act to review or
overrule those procedural decisions in advance of an award by the
LCIA arbitrators.” 62 To do so under section 37 of the Supreme Court
Act “would undermine the principles of the 1996 Act.” 63 Fourth, in
the circumstances of the case, the court thought it would be unjust to
restrain the LCIA arbitration. 64 The problem was due to two
arbitration agreements on two separate issues: the second
respondent’s claim that the settlement agreement was valid in the
Geneva arbitration and the claimant’s claim in the LCIA under the
investment agreement. It was inevitable that there would be a
multiplicity of proceedings. 65
In Intermet FCZO v. Ansol Ltd., the other case referred to in
Jarvis, the applicant (X) applied for an interim injunction to restrain
the respondents (Y) from proceeding with arbitration. 66 Y had lent
59. Id. [68]-[69] (noting that only two provisions of the 1996 Arbitration Act,
sections 44(2)(e) and 72, permit a court to intervene by imposing an injunction
before an award is made by arbitrators).
60. See id. [65].
61. See id. [74].
62. Id. [75].
63. Id.
64. See id. [88].
65. See id. [80].
66. Intermet FCZO v. Ansol Ltd. [2007] EWHC (Comm) 226, [1] (Eng.).
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money to X, who had defaulted on the repayments and owed a very
large sum. In order to postpone repayment, X had agreed to transfer
to Y the sole share in a company that allegedly owned a valuable
property in Moscow. However, X failed to repay the debt and the
company was said to be worthless. Y claimed that, at the time the
agreement was made, X knew that the company did not own the
property, so that Y was “deceived into believing that [the company]
had the rights to and interest in” the property that it did not have and
was “induced to enter the [agreement] on that basis.” 67 Pursuant to
the arbitration clause in the agreement, Y began arbitration
proceedings and claimed damages for breach of the contractual
obligations set out in the agreement. Several months later, Y also
began a court action to seek further damages. However, in that action
they sought no damages for breach of the agreement or any claim in
contract other than for the repayment of the loan, and three months
afterwards, X applied for an injunction to restrain Y from continuing
with the arbitration. 68 X submitted that the same contractual claims
were advanced against it in the arbitration as in the court proceedings
and that it would be severely unjust and prejudicial to X if the
arbitration proceedings were allowed to continue, whereas no
injustice would be caused to Y by a stay of the arbitration. 69
Mrs. Justice Gloster found that the application for the injunction
was far too late. 70 X should have applied for it immediately after the
beginning of the court proceedings. In seeking to have the tribunal
determine the issues that had been raised in the arbitration
proceedings, Y had not behaved in a manner that was oppressive or
unconscionable. Y had never sought any finding in the arbitration
that X was a party to any fraudulent conspiracy or that X had made
any fraudulent misrepresentations at any time. 71 In effect, the arbitral
claims were contractual, whereas the court proceedings dealt with
issues of fraud. Moreover, Y had not pursued any claims based upon
any alleged fraud in the arbitration. 72 It would be unjust to deprive Y
of their right to arbitrate as it would rob them of the speedy
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See id. [13].
See id. [15]-[17].
See id. [22].
See id. [25].
See id. [27].
See id.
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enforcement of any award they might obtain and would be a waste of
the enormous costs that Y had already incurred in the arbitration. 73
Accordingly, and in the light of the undertakings, it would be wholly
inappropriate to grant any injunction. 74
2. The United States 75
It is well established that U.S. courts have a general power to grant
anti-suit injunctions. 76 Before a court may grant an anti-suit
injunction, the following three threshold requirements must be met:
(1) the court issuing the injunction must have jurisdiction; (2) the
parties to both proceedings must be the same; and (3) the decision in
the action before the court issuing the injunction must dispose of the
foreign court proceedings. These threshold requirements are
sometimes referred to as the “China Trade Test.” 77 Once these
requirements have been met, the standard applied for issuing an antisuit injunction varies depending on the court before which the
injunction is sought. 78
There appear to be different approaches among the U.S. Courts of
Appeal to dealing with this question which are not explored here. 79
73. See id. [30].
74. See id. [32].
75. Anti-arbitration injunctions are also possible under certain circumstances in
Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Nigeria, Israel, Indonesia and Pakistan. See
Lew, supra note 42, at 199.
76. See Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 1996).
77. See China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1987);
see also Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877,
879-80 (3d Cir. 1981) (requiring that a district court possess proper jurisdiction as
precedent to granting an injunction).
78. See Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 626 (noting that although U.S. courts possess the
ability to allow anti-suit injunctions, the various circuits disagree on which legal
standard to apply concerning injunctive relief).
79. Compare Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 627 (applying a more liberal standard in the
consideration of granting anti-suit injunctions, declining to require a district court
to entertain “omnipotent” notions of comity), and Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull
Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431 (7th Cir. 1993) (employing a “lax” standard of
considering the effect of injunction on international comity, but requiring some
empirical evidence that the issuance of an injunction would impair international
comity in the particular case), with Quaak v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler
Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting the importance of
considering international comity in the calculation regarding imposition of an
injunction, recognizing that the issuance of an anti-suit injunction would
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Suffice it to say, in each particular case the onus is on persuading the
court that in light of “the totality of the circumstances,” including the
nature of the actions and the policies at stake, the case is suitable for
the anti-suit injunction being sought. 80
3. Switzerland
By contrast, anti-arbitration injunctions seem to be incompatible
with the Swiss legal system. Indeed, in Air (PTY) Ltd. v.
International Air Transport Ass’n, 81 the Court of First Instance of the
Canton of Geneva ruled that anti-suit injunctions, including antiarbitration injunctions, are contrary to the Swiss legal system. 82 In
particular, anti-arbitration injunctions have been found to contradict
the principle of competence-competence, which is a well-established
principle in Swiss law. According to the court:
[A]s a matter of Swiss law there is no such thing as a
“judicial tutelage” of the courts over arbitrators; quite to the
contrary, Swiss law fully implements the principle of
“Kompetenz-Kompetenz” both in its positive effect . . . and
its negative effect . . . . The jurisdiction of a court to
determine whether an arbitration agreement is valid—which
cannot in any event lead to an anti-suit injunction—exists
only when the arbitration agreement is relied upon as a
defence before the court. 83
This conclusion is consistent with the decision of the Swiss
Federal Tribunal in Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas S.A. v.
Colon Container Terminal S.A. 84 There the Federal Tribunal held
that in cases of parallel proceedings, arbitral tribunals with a seat in
essentially limit the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign’s courts), and Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (entertaining the position that the concept of international comity requires
national courts to strive to foster international legal connections in an effort to
improve the rule of law between nations).
80. See Quaak, 361 F.3d at 19.
81. See Tribunal de Première Instance [TPI] [Court of First Instance] May 2,
2005, Case No. C/1043/2005-15SP (Switz.), translated in, 23 ASA BULL. 739, 739
(2005).
82. See id. at 747.
83. Id.
84. Tribunale federale svizzero [TF] [Federal Court] May 14, 2001, 127
Decisioni del Tribunale federale svizzero [DTF] III 279.
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Switzerland must apply the principles of lis pendens and res judicata
in order to avoid contradictory awards. 85 The suggestion therefore is
that contradictory judgments are avoided, not by preventing the
rendering of foreign judgments, but by recognizing or enforcing such
judgments. 86
4. France
It seems possible for French courts to order a party to halt its
proceedings before a foreign court. 87 However, Article 1458 of the
French New Code of Civil Procedure (“NCPC”), which applies to
both domestic and international arbitrations, provides that if a dispute
pending before an arbitral tribunal on the basis of an arbitration
agreement is brought before a state court, it shall declare itself
incompetent unless the arbitration agreement is manifestly null and
void, but this issue must be raised by the party. 88 The court will then
leave it to the tribunal to determine the validity and extent of the
arbitration.
The effect of Article 1458 of the NCCP is to ensure that the
arbitral tribunal is the first to decide the issue of its jurisdiction prior
to any court or other judicial authority. 89 The role of the courts is
limited to the review of the arbitrator’s award on jurisdiction at the
annulment or enforcement stage. French courts will generally not
85. See id. at 283 (explaining that lis pendens and res judicata avoid contrary
awards by respectively paralyzing and excluding the competence of the second
judge).
86. See Loi fédérale sur le droit international privé, Dec. 18, 1987, RS 291, art.
27(2)(c) (Switz.), translated in SWITZERLAND’S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
STATUTE (Pierre A. Karrer & Karl W. Arnold trans., Kluwer Law & Taxation
Publishers, 1989) [hereinafter Swiss PIL Statute] (requiring that recognition of a
decision must be withheld in the event that the issue has already been adjudicated
in Switzerland or a third State).
87. Lew, Control of Jurisdiction, supra note 42, at 195 (citing Banque Worms
v. Epoux Brachot et autres (citation omitted)).
88. See NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [N.C.P.C.] art. 1458 (Fr.),
translated in THE FRENCH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ENGLISH (Christian Dodd
trans., 2006) [hereinafter N.C.P.C.].
89. See Vera van Houtte et al., What’s New in European Arbitration?, DISP.
RESOL. J., May-July 2008, at 10, 10 (noting that in the Cour de Cassation decision
of Prodim v. X., a finding by a lower court that the arbitration clause possessed
limitations did not permit the court to circumvent the rule that under NCCP Article
1458, an arbitrator is the primary judge of his jurisdiction).
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rule on the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement until the
arbitral tribunal has reached its own decision. 90
5. Sweden
The general practice in Sweden is for courts not to interfere with
the arbitration process in line with its philosophy that the basis of
arbitration is, and has always been, that of freedom of contract, trust
in the arbitrators, and recognition of the advantages of a single,
privately administered dispute settlement mechanism. 91 However, the
one exception to this rule relates to the validity of the arbitration
agreement, and despite recognition of the right of arbitrators to rule
on their own jurisdiction, this does not preclude a Swedish court
from doing so at the same time if requested by one of the parties. 92
6. Should National Courts Grant Anti-Arbitration Injunctions?
There will hardly ever be a justification for a national court to
grant an anti-arbitration injunction of the kind discussed. The
following observations can be made in support of this position. First,
the principles of competence-competence, separability, and party
autonomy all point to the overarching principle that a decision as to
whether an arbitration should continue should be left first and
foremost to the arbitration tribunal. 93 Second, a plain reading of
Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law and an assessment of its
underlying intention suggest the preclusion of anti-arbitration

90. See id. at 10 (highlighting the fact that Article 1458 of the NCCP
necessitates that a court decline jurisdiction in the event that a conflict has not yet
been brought to arbitration).
91. See New Arbitration Regime in Sweden, 10 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION
REP. 154, 154-55 (1999) (recognizing that under Swedish arbitration law,
contracting parties are allowed to tailor their arbitration agreements, maintaining
Sweden’s reputation as a premier location for international arbitrations).
92. See id. at 155 (underscoring that although a party’s challenge of an
arbitrator may be properly brought before a court, the arbitration may continue and
the arbitrators may issue a judgment in anticipation of the court decision).
93. See Jonnette Watson Hamilton, Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration
Clauses: Denying Access to Justice?, 51 MCGILL L.J. 693, 702-03 (2006) (noting
that generally, judicial deference for independent arbitration derives from the
belief that the arbitrator obtains his power from the contract, as opposed to the
state, and therefore the dispute resolution is regarded as solely the interest of the
disputing parties, not the public at large).
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injunctions. Article 5 states simply: “In matters governed by this
Law, no court shall intervene except where so provided in this
Law.” 94
Third, only the court of the seat of arbitration has jurisdiction with
respect to an arbitration and should exercise this only in very limited
circumstances. There can be little justification for a court at the seat
of an arbitration preventing challenge of an award by injunction. 95
Recognition and enforcement must be the preserve of the enforcing
court. No court other than the court at the seat of arbitration has a
right to interfere. Fourth, in light of the above, there can be no basis
for any court to grant an injunction on grounds of comity, balance of
convenience, or even whether an arbitration appears to be vexatious
or oppressive. Instead, the only concern of the court must be the
validity of the arbitration agreement itself. 96
Fifth, although it is argued that anti-arbitration injunctions do
sometimes serve just ends, this may often be a lengthy and costly
process leading to parallel litigation in various fora. This can be
illustrated by the case of General Electric Co. v. Deutz AG, 97 where a
U.S. court granted an anti-arbitration injunction to stop an arbitration
abroad. The underlying contract provided for ICC arbitration in
London and was concluded between General Electric and a third
company. Deutz subsequently joined in this agreement. A dispute
arose, and General Electric commenced court proceedings before a
U.S. court against Deutz, alleging breach of contract. Deutz
responded by requesting an order to compel General Electric to
arbitration in conformity with the arbitration agreement, and it
initiated an ICC arbitration. In response, General Electric requested
an anti-arbitration injunction enjoining Deutz from proceeding with
the ICC arbitration in London.
The court granted the anti-arbitration injunction based on its
general power to grant injunctive relief. It held that to respect the
international nature of the arbitration, the court should decline to

94. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 24, art. 5.
95. See Lew, Control of Jurisdiction, supra note 42, at 188-89 (citing Oil &
National Gas Commission Ltd. v. W. Co. of N. Am. (citation omitted)).
96. Lew, Achieving the Dream, supra note 2, at 477.
97. General Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 129 F. Supp. 2d 776 (W.D. Pa. 2000),
rev’d in part, 270 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2001).
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follow the restrictive standard applicable to cases of anti-suit
injunctions against foreign court proceedings. 98 The two conditions
for the granting of an anti-arbitration injunction under the restrictive
standard existed: the ICC arbitration commenced by Deutz
threatened the jurisdiction of the U.S. forum, and, by commencing
arbitration proceedings, Deutz was evading strong U.S. public
policies. 99 However, on appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the order granting the injunction, finding that the district
court failed to follow the more restrictive approach to granting antiarbitration injunctions and give due regard to principles of
international comity. 100 Thus, the parties to this dispute spent much
of their time and resources on legal proceedings that did not resolve
their dispute.
Sixth, abuse is most likely when a party approaches its own court
for assistance, that court not being the seat of the arbitration.
According to the ICC, in 2006, of the thirty-one cases where antiarbitration injunctions were granted, twenty-five were granted by
courts of the nationality of one of the parties. 101
Matters become particularly suspicious when one party is a state
or state entity, which seeks and obtains an injunction from its own
state court. There have been several unfortunate cases of this kind.
Himpurna California Energy v. Republic of Indonesia is the
infamous case of an Indonesian court issuing an anti-arbitration
injunction to stop an arbitral tribunal from rendering an award
against an Indonesian state-owned corporation. 102 The case arose
from various contracts for the construction and operation of an
electrical generation plant in Indonesia. The contracts provided for
ad hoc arbitration with the seat in Jakarta under the UNCITRAL
98. General Elec., 129 F. Supp. 2d at 787.
99. Id. at 790.
100. General Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 162 (3d Cir. 2001).
101. Lew, Control of Jurisdiction, supra note 42, at 185 n.1.
102. See, e.g., Peter Cornell & Arwen Handley, Himpurna and Hub:
International Arbitration in Developing Countries, MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP.,
Sept. 2000, at 39, 43-44; Jacques Werner, When Arbitration Becomes War: Some
Reflections on the Frailty of the Arbitral Process in Cases Involving Authoritarian
States, J. INT’L ARB., Aug. 2000, at 97, 99. Cf. H. Priyatna Abdurrasyid, They Said
I Was Going To Be Kidnapped, MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., June 2003, at 29, 29
(recounting his appointment by the Republic of Indonesia as its arbitrator in the
dispute with Himpurna and his decision not to serve as an arbitrator).
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Rules. Two different arbitration proceedings were subsequently
initiated against the Republic of Indonesia. After the first arbitral
tribunal rendered an award against PLN, an Indonesian state-owned
electricity corporation, an Indonesian court granted two injunctions:
one ordering the suspension of the enforcement of the first award,
and the second preventing the second arbitration from taking
place. 103
The case of Salini Construttori S.P.A. v. The Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia is another example where the courts of the state
party obtained an injunction in order to stop arbitration proceedings
which were taking an unfavorable turn against the state party. 104 This
arbitration had its seat in Ethiopia, but the arbitrators decided for
convenience to hold hearings in Paris. The Ethiopian representative
argued this was an abuse of the process. To place maximum pressure
to halt the arbitration, the Ethiopian courts granted two antiarbitration injunctions, one directed against the arbitral tribunal and
one against the claimant. 105
Hub Power Co. (HUBCO) v. Water & Power Development
Authority of Pakistan (WAPDA) is yet another example where the
state party to an arbitration agreement obtained from the courts of its
country an order preventing an arbitration from proceeding. 106 The
103. Cornell & Handley, supra note 104, at 44.
104. See Salini Costruttori S.P.A. v. The Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia, Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority, Case No.
10623/AER/ACS, 21 ASA BULL. 82 (2003) (Int’l Ct. Arb. 2001); see also Antonio
Crivellaro, Summary of the Arbitral Proceedings – International Arbitrators and
Courts of the Seat – Who Defers to Whom?, 21 ASA BULL. 60 (2003); M. Scherer,
The Place or ‘Seat’ of Arbitration (Possibility, and/or Sometimes Necessity of its
Transfer?) – Some Remarks on the Award in ICC Arbitration No. 10623, 21 ASA
BULL. 112, 112-19 (2003); Frédéric Bachand, Must an ICC Tribunal Comply With
an Anti-Suit Injunction Issued by the Courts of the Seat of Arbitration?, MEALEY’S
INT’L ARB. REP., Mar. 2005, at 47, 47-52.
105. Bachand, supra note 104, at 47.
106. See HubCo Judgment Transcript in the Supreme Court of Pakistan
(Appellate Jurisdiction), Civ. App. Nos. 1398 & 1399 of 1999, The Hub Power Co.
v. Pak. WAPDA & Fed’n of Pak., 16 ARB. INT'L 439, 456-58 (2000) [hereinafter
HUBCO v. WAPDA], reprinted in MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., July 2000, at A-1;
see also Louise Barrington, HUBCO v. WAPDA: Pakistan Top Court Rejects
Modern Arbitration, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB., 385, 385-96 (2000); Nudrat B.
Majeed, Commentary on the Hubco Judgment, 16 ARB. INT’L 431, 431-37 (2000);
Neil Kaplan, Arbitration in Asia—Developments and Crises, 19 J. INT’L ARB. 245,
245-60 (2002).
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dispute arose out of a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) concluded
between HUBCO, a company incorporated in Pakistan, and
WAPDA, a Pakistani state-owned company. The Supreme Court of
Pakistan had to decide which of two anti-suit injunctions to uphold.
HUBCO had obtained an injunction restraining WAPDA from
seeking resolution of the dispute through any other means except
through ICC arbitration; WAPDA obtained an injunction restraining
HUBCO from pursuing the arbitration. 107 The Supreme Court of
Pakistan held that the only question to be decided was whether the
dispute was arbitrable. 108 By majority, it decided the matters raised
were not arbitrable as they involved matters of criminality.109 Thus, it
decided that HUBCO must desist from pursuing the London
arbitration and bring its claim before the courts of Pakistan. 110
In Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. (SGS) v. Federation of
Pakistan, the Pakistani Supreme Court issued an anti-arbitration
injunction against SGS, restraining it from “taking any step, action or
measure to pursue or participate or to continue to pursue or
participate in the ICSID arbitration.” 111 The dispute arose out of a
contract for the assessment of all customs duties payable on goods
imported into Pakistan. The contract contained an arbitration clause
providing for arbitration in Islamabad under the Pakistani Arbitration
Act of 1940. When the dispute arose, SGS first initiated court
proceedings in Switzerland. SGS claimed it could not rely on the
arbitration clause because no fair trial could be expected in Pakistan.
The Swiss courts denied SGS’s request. 112 SGS then initiated an
arbitration at the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) on the basis of the PakistanSwitzerland bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”). On the ground that
neither the ICSID Convention nor the Pakistan-Switzerland BIT had
been implemented into Pakistani law, the Supreme Court granted

107. Barrington, supra note 106, at 439-42.
108. Id. at 447.
109. Id. at 458-59.
110. Id. at 459; but see id. at 456 (Jehangiri J., dissenting) (concluding that the
ICC arbitration should have been allowed to proceed).
111. Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Fed’n of Pak., Supreme Court of
Pakistan (Appellate Jurisdiction), Civ. App. Nos. 459 & 460 of 2002, ¶ 84,
reprinted in 2003 Y.B. COMM. ARB. (Int’l Council for Comm. Arb.) 1312, 1341.
112. Id. at 1312-13.
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Pakistan’s request to proceed with the arbitration under the
Arbitration Act of 1940 pursuant to the contract. 113
It is worth noting that tribunals refused to be intimidated and
continued their work in most of the cases referred to above when an
anti-arbitration order was made.
Seventh, even if an award might eventually be set aside or
enforcement refused by a competent court, the anti-arbitration
injunction negates the process by which this is supposed to take
place. 114 These points are well illustrated in English court decision in
Albon v. Naza Motor Trading. 115 In that case, the claimant applied
for an injunction restraining the respondent from pursuing arbitration
in Malaysia on the basis that there was an oral underlying agreement
that was subject to English law. Although there was a written joint
venture agreement containing an arbitration clause and signed by the
parties in Malaysia, and subject to Malaysian law, the claimant
claimed its signature had been forged. The High Court issued an
injunction to stop the proceedings in Malaysia until the matter of the
authenticity of the signature had been determined by the English
court. The judge claimed jurisdiction on the basis that (1) the oral
contract was made under English law; (2) the respondent had applied
for stay of the English court proceedings in favor of arbitration
proceedings and in so doing had submitted to the English court; and
(3) if the injunction was not granted, the instant proceedings would
become duplicative. 116

V. ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS
Anti-suit injunctions operating in personam are aimed at
preventing or restraining proceedings in courts in breach of an
arbitration agreement. Such injunctions are typical when there are
concurrent proceedings in another jurisdiction. The anti-suit
injunction is not directed at the foreign court but at the defendant
who has promised, through the arbitration clause, not to bring foreign
proceedings. 117
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 1314.
See Albon v. Naza Motor Trading, [2007] EWHC (Ch) 1879 (Eng.).
Id. [1].
Id. [1], [20], [22], [27].
Lew, Anti-Suit Injunctions, supra note 39, at 25.
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There are three important points to be made in relation to anti-suit
injunctions: first, the importance of the anti-suit injunction to the
supervisory role of the national courts is by and large now widely
recognized. 118 These injunctions may have a vital role to play in the
hands of national courts at the seat of arbitration in its supervisory
role over the arbitration process. 119 However, the hurdles to be
surmounted before awarding an anti-suit injunction differ from
country to country.
For example, in England, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the
jurisdiction to grant an injunction is discretionary and held that
English courts should feel no diffidence in granting injunctions
provided they are “sought promptly and before the foreign
proceedings are too far advanced.” 120 In Aggeliki Charis Compania
Maritima S.A. v. Pagnan S.P.A., the Court of Appeal upheld an
injunction preventing a party to an arbitration in England from
proceeding with a claim before the courts in Italy. 121 Similarly, in
Starlight Shipping Co. v. Tai Ping Insurance Co., the English court
granted a ship owner an anti-suit injunction to restrain Chinese
proceedings commenced in breach of an arbitration clause found in a
bill of lading. 122 The defendants claimed that they were not bound to
the arbitration agreement as a matter of Chinese law. 123
The position of U.S. courts regarding anti-suit injunctions
enforcing arbitration agreements is set out in BHP Petroleum
(Americas) Inc. v. Reinhold. 124 In this case, BHP Petroleum
requested that the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas compel Baer to arbitration in Texas and enjoin him from
continuing with court proceedings in Ecuador. The court decided:
118. Lew, Control of Jurisdiction, supra note 42, at 187.
119. Id. (stating that the court of the seat of the arbitration “may stay an
arbitration or set aside an award on jurisdiction if they consider that the arbitral
tribunal does not have jurisdiction”).
120. Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima S.A. v. Pagnan S.P.A. (1995) 1
Lloyd’s Rep. 87, 88 (Eng.).
121. Id. at 96-97.
122. Starlight Shipping Co. v. Tai Ping Ins. Co., [2007] EWHC (Comm) 1893
(Eng.).
123. Id. [14] (dismissing this claim as being irrelevant to the English courts
because it is part of the dispute arising from a contract with an arbitration clause).
124. BHP Petroleum (Americas) Inc. v. Reinhold, Civ. No. H-97-879 (S.D. Tex.
1997), reprinted in 12 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., May 1997, at I-1.
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that an injunction barring a foreign action was proper if the
simultaneous prosecution of an action would result in
“inequitable hardship” and “tend to frustrate and delay the
speedy and efficient determination of the cause.” . . . The
focus of the inquiry is whether there exists a need to prevent
vexatious or oppressive litigation. . . . In light of the strong
federal policy favoring arbitration, the court finds that
Plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed if Baer were permitted
to continue litigating in Ecuador while the same claims were
being arbitrated. Therefore, the court [grants] Plaintiffs’
application for injunction. 125
It would appear that the approach of the U.S. courts is stricter than
the English courts. An important criterion for the granting of the
injunction in the United States is “irreparable harm.” This
requirement was defined by the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York in Empresa Generadora de Electricidad
ITABO v. Corporacio Dominicana de Empresas Electricas Estatales
(CDEEE). 126 In this case, ITABO, a private company incorporated in
the Dominican Republic, requested the court to compel CDEEE, a
company owned by the Dominican Republic, to ICC arbitration in
New York in conformity with the arbitration agreement contained in
ITABO’s bylaws. It also requested an anti-suit injunction to enjoin
CDEEE from continuing with litigation in the Dominican courts. The
court denied both requests. Concerning the anti-suit injunction, the
court held that “ITABO [had] not met [the] heavy burden of
establishing irreparable harm.” 127 It defined this notion in the
following terms:
[i]njunctive relief “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy
which should not be routinely granted.” . . . Where necessary

125. Id. at I-4 (citing Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1996));
see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. PT Multipolar Corp., Nos. 98-16952 & 9817384, 1999 WL 1079625, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 30, 1999) (upholding an injunction
based on equitable considerations and the fact that further litigation in home states
would lead to delay and unnecessary expense).
126. No. 05 Civ. 5004, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. July 18,
2005).
127. Id. at *24-26 (pointing out that ITABO had allowed months to go by before
seeking relief in court, that any harm to ITABO is speculative, and that ITABO has
not shown that it would lose arbitration rights by complying with a future
Dominican court order).
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to prevent irreparable harm, “a federal court may enjoin a
party before it from pursuing litigation in a foreign
forum.” . . . Irreparable harm is injury that “is likely and
imminent, not remote or speculative, and . . . is not capable of
being fully remedied by money damages.” . . . The movant is
required to establish not a mere possibility of irreparable
harm, but that it is “likely to suffer irreparable harm if
equitable relief is denied.” 128
The courts of Singapore were initially reluctant to grant anti-suit
injunctions in support of arbitration, at least when Singapore was not
the seat of arbitration. 129 In 2002, however, the Singapore High Court
in WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd. v. Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka
granted an anti-suit injunction against the respondent to protect the
contractual right of WSG to refer its dispute with the board to
arbitration in Singapore. 130 This was apparently the first reported
case of an anti-suit injunction in favor of arbitration granted in
Singapore. 131
One vital question is whether it is appropriate for a court to award
injunctions where it has not been seized and is not the seat of
arbitration. The Bermuda Court of Appeal considered this issue in
IPOC International Growth Fund Ltd. v. OAO “CT-Mobile” (the
“IPOC case”). 132 The parties were involved in arbitration
proceedings in Europe. IPOC commenced court proceedings in New
York and in Russia. The main question before the Bermuda Court of
Appeal was whether it was entitled to grant an injunction to restrain a
breach of an arbitration agreement on the basis that it has in
personam jurisdiction over IPOC (as a Bermuda company), or
128. Id. at *16 (citations omitted).
129. See Mancon (BVI) Inv. Holding Co. v. Heng Holdings SEA (Pte) Ltd. &
Ors, [2000] 3 SLR 220, [35] (Sing.) (refusing to grant an injunction because it
would interfere with the jurisdiction of other courts).
130. WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd. v. Bd. of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka, [2002] 3
SLR 603, [91] (Sing.).
131. On international arbitration in Singapore, see Andrew Chan & Tay Yong
Seng, Securing Arbitration in the Face of Litigation—A Singapore Perspective, 2
ASIAN INT’L ARB. J. 113, 113-36 (2006).
132. IPOC Int’l Growth Fund Ltd. v. OAO “CT-Mobile”, Nos. 22 & 23 (Berm.
Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2007) (on file with author); see also Jan Woloniecki,
Enforcement of Transnational Investment Arbitration Awards In Bermuda:
Jurisdiction And Sovereign Immunity (Apr. 13, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
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whether, as IPOC argued, the Bermuda court must in addition have
some “sufficient interest” before it can grant an anti-suit injunction.
The Bermuda Court of Appeal rejected the argument that only the
court at the seat of the arbitration can issue an anti-suit injunction
and held personal jurisdiction to be sufficient. 133 While the proarbitration decision is welcome, it is strongly arguable that courts
taking jurisdiction on similar or other grounds would be unjustifiably
interfering with the arbitration process. 134 As argued above, in the
normal course, only the court at the seat of arbitration should
interfere with the arbitral process, and even then only rarely.
The second point is that national courts might arguably use the
anti-suit injunction whenever they consider it necessary to protect the
parties’ agreement to arbitrate. 135 In this regard, anti-suit injunctions
in the arbitration context are inherently different from injunctions
awarded in other contexts. This difference has mostly to do with the
nature of arbitration itself. Other types of injunctions are issued to
correct or alter otherwise wrongful or unconscionable conduct. In
anti-suit injunctions, the court’s concern ought to be to restrain a
party from attempting to circumvent its promise to arbitrate. 136 In this
regard, the court ought not to be concerned by issues of oppressive or
vexatious conduct, or be overly sensitive to questions of comity. 137
The injunction bites only because the parties have agreed to have
their dispute resolved via a mechanism that transcends any individual
jurisdiction. 138 Courts ought to resist muddying the waters with any
other concerns.
In Starlight Shipping Co. v. Tai Ping Insurance Co., the English
High Court also confirmed that injunctions awarded in the arbitration
context are not about wrongful or unconscionable conduct, which
was central to the anti-suit injunction granted by the courts of
133. IPOC, ¶¶ 45-50.
134. See Lew, Achieving the Dream, supra note 2, at 455-56.
135. See José Carlos Fernández Rozas, Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by National
Courts: Measures Addressed to the Parties or to the Arbitrators, in ANTI-SUIT
INJUNCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 41, at 73, 79-80 (noting
that anti-suit injunctions can also “paralyz[e] arbitral proceedings”).
136. See Lew, Achieving the Dream, supra note 2, at 477.
137. Cf. Lew, Control of Jurisdiction, supra note 42, at 192 (suggesting that
some U.S. Courts of Appeal award anti-suit injunctions based on a vexatious or
oppressive standard, and some use a standard based on comity).
138. Lew, Achieving the Dream, supra note 2, at 456.
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equity, 139 but more about “restraining a party to a contract from
doing something [that it] has promised not to do.” 140 Anti-suit
injunctions made other than in the context of arbitration are not
subject to limitations imposed by the principles of comity. 141 In this
regard, Justice Cooke referred to the speech of Lord Justice
Longmore in O.T. Africa Line Ltd. v. Magic Sportswear Corp.: “It
goes without saying that any court should pay respect to another
(foreign) court but, if the parties have actually agreed that a [forum]
is to have sole jurisdiction over any dispute, the true role of comity is
to ensure that the parties’ agreement is respected.” 142 Lord Justice
Longmore further added to these justifications some practical
observations, namely that the benefit of a court’s exercising its
discretion to award an injunction at an early stage of an arbitration
where matters are straightforward is that it will prevent matters from
being heard twice, first before arbitrators and then again later before
courts. 143 Further, by ordering anti-suit injunctions, the applying
party is able to benefit from contempt of court proceedings.144

A. SHOULD ARBITRATION CLAUSES BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY
FROM JURISDICTION CLAUSES?
One conceptual problem closely related to this area of discussion,
and which has the potential for serious practical ramifications, is
whether arbitration clauses ought to be treated differently from
standard jurisdiction clauses. This is a matter that has recently
exercised the European courts. As a general rule, regulation 44/2001
(the “Brussels Regulation”) sets out the rules of jurisdiction that
apply to the European Union. 145 Under Article 27 of the Brussels
139. See Starlight Shipping Co. v. Tai Ping Ins. Co., [2007] EWHC (Comm)
1893, [44] (Eng.).
140. Id.; cf. Laker Airways Ltd. v. British Airways Bd., (1985) A.C. 58, ¶¶ 1315 (H.L.).
141. See Airbus Industries G.I.E. v. Patel, (1999) 1 A.C. 119, 134 (H.L.)
(recognizing courts should, based on notions of comity, be hesitant to grant an
anti-suit injunction, but noting there is no such requirement in cases where comity
is breached).
142. Starlight, [2007] EWHC (Comm) 1893, [44] (citing O.T. Africa Line Ltd.
v. Magic Sportswear Corp., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 710, [32] (Eng.)).
143. See O.T. Africa, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 710, [36], [40].
144. Cf. Starlight, [2007] EWHC (Comm) 1893, [43].
145. Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 2, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC) available
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Regulation, regardless of what the parties may have agreed with
respect to jurisdiction, once a court within an EU Member State has
been seized with an action, no other court within the EU can interfere
with the matter. 146 This is the principle of lis pendens. 147 It makes no
difference how much bad faith is displayed by a party to litigation in
starting proceedings in a Member State; it is for that Member State to
assume or decline jurisdiction. 148
It is clear from European case law that this principle applies even
where there is a choice of jurisdiction clause. 149 However,
Article 1(2)(d) expressly excludes arbitration from the scope of the
Brussels Regulation. The issue, though, is whether the term
arbitration includes all matters relating to arbitration, such as the
validity of the arbitration agreement, or whether it relates only to
procedural matters and enforcement issues. Article 1(2)(d) of the
Brussels Regulation and its forerunner, Article 1(4) of the Brussels
Convention, were purposely left vague in this regard. 150
This question has recently been considered by the European Court
of Justice (“ECJ”), following a referral from the House of Lords, in
West Tankers Inc. v. RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta S.P.A., where

at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:012:0001:
0023:EN:PDF [hereinafter Brussels Regulation] (stating persons domiciled in a
member state are to be sued in that member state).
146. See id. art. 27.
147. See id. (entitling section 9, which contains article 27, “Lis pendens—related
actions”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 950 (8th ed. 2004) (defining lis
pendens as “a pending lawsuit” or “the jurisdiction, power, or control acquired by
a court over property while a legal action is pending”).
148. Cf. Brussels Regulation, supra note 146, art. 27 (leaving it to the court first
presented with the matter to establish jurisdiction, while other courts should stay
proceedings in the interim).
149. Cf. Case C-116/02, Gasser v. MISAT, 2003 E.C.R. I-14693, ¶ 49 (noting
“it is incumbent on the court first seised to verify the existence of the agreement
and to decline jurisdiction if it is established, in accordance with Article 17, that
the parties actually agreed to designate the court second seised as having exclusive
jurisdiction”); Case C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. I-3565, ¶ 26. On this
whole issue, see generally Stavros Brekoulakis, The Notion of the Superiority of
Arbitration Agreements over Jurisdiction Agreements. Time to Abandon It?, 24 J.
INT’L ARB. 341 (2007).
150. See Brussels Regulation, supra note 146, art. 1(2)(d); Convention on
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters art.
1(4), Sept. 27, 1968, 1262 U.N.T.S. 153, available at http://curia.europa.eu/
common/recdoc/convention/en/c-textes/brux-idx.htm.
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an insured commenced London arbitration to recover excess losses
from a collision. 151 During the course of the arbitration, the owners
of the vessels became aware that the insurers had commenced court
proceedings against them in Italy. The English High Court granted
an injunction stopping the insurers from continuing with the Italian
proceedings on the grounds that: (1) under English law the duty to
arbitrate was an inseparable part of the subject matter transferred;
(2) the insurer was bound by the arbitration clause; and (3) the
attitude of the foreign court (the Italian court paid no attention to the
injunction) was irrelevant where an arbitration clause was concerned.
The House of Lords considered whether it is “consistent with EC
Regulation 44/2001 for a court of a Member State to make an order
to restrain a person from commencing or continuing proceedings in
another Member State” where there is a valid arbitration
agreement. 152 The Lords considered that this was a matter that should
be referred to the ECJ. 153 However, in making the reference, the
Lords expressed their views, which are not binding on any court, but
which indicated the way the House of Lords hoped (unsuccessfully)
this issue would be resolved. 154 Lord Hoffman, for example, opined
that an order for restraint where a party had started proceedings
contrary to an arbitration clause was not contrary to the Brussels
regulation:
The basic principles by which the [Brussels] regulation
allocates jurisdiction, giving priority (subject to exceptions)
to the domicile of the defendant, are entirely unsuited to
arbitration, in which the situs and governing law are generally
chosen by the parties on grounds of neutrality, availability of
legal services and the unobtrusive effectiveness of the
supervisory jurisdiction. There is no set of uniform
Community rules which Member States can or must trust
each other to apply. 155

151. RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA v. West Tankers Inc., [2007]
UKHL 4, [11]-[12] (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
152. Id. [23].
153. Id. [25].
154. Id. [9] (restricting the basis for the opinion of Lord Hoffman solely to the
Brussels Regulation).
155. Id. [12].
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Lord Hoffman’s reasoning is correct, and it would be quite wrong
for the ECJ to allow arbitration agreements to be undermined by a
party simply by starting proceedings in a court of the European
Union. No matter what the wording of the Brussels Regulation was
intended to mean, there are very good reasons for courts to treat
jurisdiction clauses differently from arbitration clauses. First,
jurisdiction clauses serve to allocate jurisdiction between national
regimes; the national regimes therefore remain in play. In contrast,
an agreement to arbitrate takes the dispute out of any national
framework and places it within a self-contained regime. 156
Secondly, in the arbitration context, it is not a matter of a contest
between rival national jurisdictions. Instead, any powers the courts
have are supervisory. 157 Proper jurisdiction lies with the arbitral
tribunal. This is vital because the arbitral tribunal is not a party to
any convention or agreement relating to jurisdiction and has no need
to respect comity. 158 In fact, the sole duty of the tribunal is to carry
out the terms of the arbitration agreement. In the normal course,
arbitration proceedings will not be stayed while national court
proceedings are pending. 159
The European Court of Justice judgment was handed down on 10
February 2009. 160 It determined that the use of an anti-suit injunction
to prevent a court of a Member State which has jurisdiction to
resolve a dispute under Regulation No 44/2001 from ruling on the
applicability of the regulation to the dispute brought before it seeks
to deny that court of the power to rule on its own jurisdiction under
Regulation No 44/2001. The Court held:
156. But cf. Brekoulakis, supra note 150, at 342 (arguing as between arbitration
and jurisdiction agreements, arbitration agreements have a more favorable status
because they are better regulated and more favored by the courts).
157. Cf. id. at 343 (finding the “legal framework” of arbitration “establishes a
duty for the national courts to enforce an arbitration agreement whenever they are
seized of a dispute covered by the scope of the arbitration agreement”).
158. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 22, art. 8; cf. Yuval Shany,
Comment, Contract Claims vs. Treaty Claims: Mapping Conflicts Between ICSID
Decisions on Multisourced Investment Claims, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 835, 849-50
(2005) (noting ICSID arbitrators find judicial comity inherent in the judicial
process).
159. Cf. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 24, art. 8(2).
160. Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc, 2009 ECJ EUR-Lex
LEXIS 24 (Feb. 10, 2009).

2009]

NATIONAL COURT INVOLVEMENT

523

It is incompatible with Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001
of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters for
a court of a Member State to make an order to restrain a
person from commencing or continuing proceedings before
the courts of another Member State on the ground that such
proceedings would be contrary to an arbitration agreement. 161
This decision bars English courts from granting anti-suit
injunctions to restrain a party bringing proceedings in a court of a
European Member State in breach of an arbitration agreement.
However, this decision is not necessarily anti-arbitration. It leaves it
to each national court in which proceedings are brought to decide for
itself whether the arbitration agreement is valid and binding and
covers the specific dispute between the parties. There is of course a
risk of parallel proceedings, additional costs, the possibility for a
financially stronger party to exert pressure on a weaker party by
additional proceedings and even conflicting decisions. It will be for
the national courts to try and keep such abuses to a minimum by
applying Article II of the New York Convention strictly.
One must recognize that it is possible for national courts to misuse
anti-suit injunctions, but this was not a reason for the ECJ
decision. 162 The greatest risk of such misuse appears to be when they
are granted after the arbitration award, that is, where they are
employed by courts of the seat of an arbitration to protect an
arbitration award that has already been made. There are several
recent examples of instances where anti-suit injunctions of this type
have been sought. In Noble Assurance Co. v. Gerling-Konzern
General Insurance Co., the English court exercised its discretion to
grant an anti-suit injunction to prevent a defendant to arbitration
proceedings from continuing an action commenced in a different

161. Id. [35].
162. See Ibeto Petrochemical Indus. Ltd. v. M/T Beffen, 475 F.3d 56, 65 (2d
Cir. 2007) (cautioning that “due regard for principles of international comity and
reciprocity require a delicate touch in the issuance of anti-foreign suit injunctions,
that such injunctions should be used sparingly, and that the pendency of a suit
involving the same parties and same issues does not alone form the basis for such
an injunction”).
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jurisdiction designed to nullify the arbitration award made against
it. 163
In C v. D, the English court held that an insured was entitled to an
anti-suit injunction preventing the insurer from challenging a London
arbitration award in the United States because the attempt to invoke
the jurisdiction of another court was a breach of the contract to
arbitrate. 164 The insurer threatened to apply to the New York courts
on the ground that the award was “a manifest disregard of New York
law.” 165 This constituted a threatened breach of the arbitration
agreement and had to be stopped. 166 Mr Justice Cooke found that the
agreement dealing with the seat of arbitration was “akin to an
agreement to an exclusive jurisdiction clause,” and that such
agreement included an agreement that the courts at the seat of
arbitration had supervisory powers. 167 Further, by agreeing to the seat
of arbitration, the parties agreed that any challenges to an award were
“to be made only in the courts of the place designated as the seat of
arbitration.” 168 In this regard, the choice of New York as the
Governing Law was found to be irrelevant when it came to
challenging the arbitration award. To take a step that would “negate
the whole framework in which the arbitration took place” was
vexatious, oppressive, unconscionable, and an abuse of process. 169
C was therefore entitled to injunctive relief.
In KBC v. Pertamina, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit upheld an injunction to prevent Pertamina from taking
proceedings in the Cayman Islands to recover moneys paid out under
an award against it on the pretext that the award was procured by
fraud. 170 This infamous, longstanding, and multi-faceted litigation
involved proceedings in different jurisdictions, including an
arbitration which found against Pertamina. The Court of Appeals
163. See generally Noble Assurance Co. v. Gerling-Konzern Gen. Ins. Co.,
[2006] EWHC (Comm) 253 (Eng.).
164. See generally C v. D, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 1282 (Eng.).
165. Id. [7].
166. Id. [29].
167. See C v. D, [2007] EWHC (Comm) 1541, [29] (Eng.).
168. Id.
169. See id. [58]; see also Noble Assurance Co. v. Gerling-Konzern Gen. Ins.
Co., [2006] EWHC (Comm) 253, [95] (Eng.).
170. See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara, 500 F.3d 111, 125 n.17 (2d Cir. 2007).
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held that in this case, an anti-suit injunction was necessary “to
prevent Pertamina from engaging in litigation that would tend to
undermine the regime established by the Convention for recognition
and enforcement of arbitral awards.” 171 The U.S. Court of Appeals
recognized the importance of comity, the importance of respect for
the capacities of foreign transnational tribunals, and the need to be
sensitive to the needs of the international commercial system for
predictability in the resolution of disputes. However, here there was
no mere disagreement with the way the arbitral award had been
enforced. This would not justify an injunction. Instead, where there
was a concerted effort to undermine the arbitral process the court
found that “federal courts are not obliged to sit by idly when a party
engages in proceedings that undermine the regime governing
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards established by the
Convention.” 172 The appeal against the injunction was dismissed and
the injunction allowed. 173
In a recent Peruvian case, an injunction was awarded by the Civil
Court of Lima to preserve an award granted under the 1996 Peruvian
Arbitration Act. 174 The original award obliged the Peruvian mining
companies to transfer the rights in a gold and silver mine to Sulliden
and its Peruvian subsidiary. This injunction, however, was released
as the court was persuaded that the official who signed the contract
containing the arbitration lacked the required authority. 175
Injunctions granted by courts other than at the seat of the
arbitration or the place of enforcement of an award against foreign
proceedings in connection with an award, although perhaps on
occasion justified on grounds of justice, will often be counter to the
fundamental principles of international arbitration. First, the seat of
arbitration has a supervisory role only until an award has been
made. 176 It has no duty to offer to protect an award as a matter of

171. Id. at 125.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 130.
174. See generally Sulliden, Press Releases: December 18, 2007,
http://www.sulliden.com/PressReleases_en/PR_20071218.html.
175. See Peru Sets Aside Contract Arbitration Award, GLOBAL ARB. REV., Sept.
2007, at 6; see generally Sulliden, http://www.sulliden.com.
176. Cf. Graham Dunning QC, Stop – or go? Injunctions and Arbitration,
Master’s Lecture before the Worshipful Company of Arbitrators 7-8 (Mar. 13,
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right. The proper way to challenge an award is at the courts of the
seat of arbitration or to resist enforcement at the place of
enforcement, and this is only on limited grounds. 177 The court at the
seat of arbitration should not interfere with this process.
Secondly, the court of the place of enforcement has no duty or
power to protect an arbitration award made in a foreign state. 178 Its
duty is only to enforce an award in accordance with the New York
Convention. A court seized with an action has the sole right to
determine the legitimacy of that action and to decide on its own
jurisdiction. Any other approach to those set out above cannot be
justified in terms of the New York Convention and the autonomous
nature of arbitration. It undermines trust between Convention states,
raises issues of international comity and respect between nations, and
opens the way to confusion and ultimately injustice. 179

B. PRO-ARBITRATION ORDERS
Pro-arbitration orders are orders issued by national courts for
specific performance of arbitration agreements. On their face these
injunctions offer powerful support for the arbitration process in that
they directly compel parties to undertake what they have already
agreed upon. There are two important issues relating to courts’
compelling arbitration. The first is whether orders compelling
arbitration accord with the underlying principles of the international
arbitration regime. The second issue is that if such orders are made,
how far should they reach, and in particular, should courts be entitled
to make orders against parties who are not on the face of the
arbitration clause party to the arbitration agreement?
1. When Should Courts Compel Parties to Arbitrate?
This question is handled differently in different jurisdictions. The
United States offers courts the greatest powers in terms of ordering
specific performance. In the United States, an arbitration agreement
2008), available at http://www.arbitratorscompany.com/pdfs/Master's_Lecture_
2008_text.pdf.
177. See id.
178. Cf. id. at 8 (arguing under the New York Convention scheme, control of a
final award is the sole responsibility of the courts where enforcement is sought).
179. Cf. id.
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can be enforced by a court order forcing a reluctant party to go to
arbitration, and a party that does not follow the court’s order will be
in contempt of court. 180 Sections 4 and 206 of the Federal Arbitration
Act (“FAA”) allow a party aggrieved by the failure or refusal of a
contracting party to arbitrate under a written arbitration agreement to
seek an order directing that such party participate in the arbitration as
agreed and that a party who ignores the order will be in contempt of
court. 181 This compelling power applies even if the agreed-upon seat
of the arbitration is outside the United States. It can have very
important implications for default awards as too often parties decide
for tactical reasons, which may assist in resisting enforcement, to
refuse to participate in the arbitration despite the arbitration
agreement. 182
This power was exercised in Paramedics Electromedicina
Comercial, Ltd. v. GE Medical Systems Information Technologies,
Inc., where the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted a motion to compel the performance of an arbitration
agreement providing for arbitration under the rules of the InterAmerican Commercial Arbitration Commission in Miami. 183 When a
dispute arose, Paramedics brought suit before a Brazilian court
notwithstanding the arbitration agreement. GE Medical Systems
initiated arbitration proceedings. When Paramedics requested an
anti-arbitration injunction from a New York court, GE Medical
Systems requested an order compelling arbitration and an anti-suit
injunction enjoining Paramedics from continuing with the Brazilian
court proceedings. The court rejected Paramedics’ request for an
anti-arbitration injunction against GE Medical Systems. At the same
time, it granted both the motion to compel Paramedics to arbitration
and the anti-suit injunction enjoining Paramedics from continuing
with the Brazilian action. The court held that where it is established
180. See generally GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
380 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing court orders compelling the performance of
arbitration agreements in U.S. law).
181. Federal Arbitration Act §§ 4, 206, 9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 206 (2006).
182. Id. § 4 (providing recourse for an aggrieved party “if the jury find that an
agreement for arbitration was made in writing and that there is a default in
proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order summarily directing the
parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof”).
183. 369 F.3d 645, 652 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming the judgment of the District
Court in granting “GEMS-IT’s motion to compel arbitration”).
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that an arbitration agreement exists and that one of the parties to this
agreement is not in compliance with it, an order compelling
arbitration without further proceedings may be issued. 184
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the anti-suit injunction and the imposition of sanctions, but
remanded for reconsideration of the amount of the sanctions. The
Second Circuit held that “[a]n anti-suit injunction against parallel
litigation may be imposed only if: (A) the parties are the same in
both matters, and (B) resolution of the case before the enjoining
court is dispositive of the action to be enjoined.” 185 The court found
that “the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the”
defendant sufficiently met the two requirements. 186 Cases such as
these take their steer from the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., where the
Court stated that a party that makes a bargain to arbitrate “should be
held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude
a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.” 187
Although pro-arbitration injunctions ought to appeal to those who
support arbitration, there are good reasons to doubt whether they are
beneficial to the arbitral process and/or accord with the core
principles of arbitration practice. First, most national laws do not
expressly allow courts to order parties to participate in arbitration
proceedings even where there is a valid arbitration agreement. Rather
the pressure is negative by refusing access to the court for matters
covered by the arbitration agreement. 188 There is nothing in the New
York Convention to suggest that a court has a duty to compel
arbitration. Courts only have a duty to “refer” a party to
arbitration. 189 The same language is used in the UNCITRAL Model
Law. 190 The French NCPC requires a court to “decline jurisdiction”

184. Id. at 649 (concluding “that the anti-suit injunction was an appropriate
measure to enforce and protect the judgment compelling arbitration”).
185. See id. at 652.
186. Id. at 652-54.
187. 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
188. See Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Constr. Ltd., [1993] A.C.
334, 367-68 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Ir.) (U.K.) (holding that court had power to
stay proceedings brought in violation of arbitration agreement).
189. New York Convention, supra note 10, art. II, § 3.
190. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 22, art. 8, § 1.
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in the face of an arbitration clause, 191 the Swiss PILA (Private
International Law Statute) also requires a court to “decline
jurisdiction”; 192 the German ZPO (Civil Procedure Code) requires
national authorities to reject court proceedings brought in breach of
an arbitration agreement as being inadmissible; 193 and section 9 of
the English Arbitration Act of 1996 provides for a stay of court
action. 194
The Channel Tunnel case is a prominent example where a court
refused to order parties to arbitration but stayed the court
proceedings in support of an arbitration agreement. 195 Eurotunnel
(the owners of the tunnel) and Trans-Manche Link (a consortium of
English and French companies) had concluded a contract for the
construction of a tunnel under the English Channel between England
and France. The contract provided for a two-stage dispute resolution
mechanism. First, any dispute between Eurotunnel and TransManche Link should be brought before a Panel of Experts. Then, if
either party disagreed with the Panel’s decision, the dispute could be
referred to ICC arbitration with its seat in Brussels. A dispute arose
as to the amounts payable in respect of the works on the tunnel’s
cooling system. Trans-Manche Link threatened to suspend their work
alleging a breach of contract by Eurotunnel. Eurotunnel brought an
action in the English courts requesting an interim injunction to
restrain Trans-Manche Link from suspending their works. TransManche Link argued that the English courts did not have the power
to order such an injunction.
In addition, Trans-Manche Link requested a stay of the action
brought by Eurotunnel in favor of the arbitration on the basis of the
then governing Arbitration Act of 1975. The English House of Lords
decided to stay the proceedings in favor of arbitration based on the

191. N.C.P.C., supra note 88, art. 1458.
192. Swiss PIL Statute, supra note 86, art. 7.
193. Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Civil Procedure Statute] Dec. 5, 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] I, 3302, as amended, § 1032, ¶ 1 (F.R.G.), translated in
GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE & CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ENGLISH (Charles
E. Stewart trans., 2001).
194. Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 9 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.
gov.uk/Acts/acts1996/plain/ukpga_19960023_en#sch1.
195. Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Constr. Ltd., [1993] A.C.
334, 367-68 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Ir.) (U.K.).
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court’s inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings brought before it in
breach of an arbitration agreement. 196 Section 9 of the 1975
Arbitration Act further provided in its fourth paragraph that “the
court shall grant a stay unless satisfied that the arbitration agreement
is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.” 197
The obligation to stay proceedings under section 9 applies even if the
arbitral seat “is outside England and Wales or Northern Ireland or no
seat has been designated or determined.” 198 However, there is no
power under the English Arbitration Act of 1996 for the courts to
order a party to participate in an arbitration. Instead of actively
enforcing an arbitration agreement, therefore, most national courts
are similarly limited to a passive role, giving effect to the arbitration
agreement only indirectly. 199
Secondly, the stay of court proceedings brought in breach of an
arbitration agreement might be indirect but is nevertheless an
efficient means of ensuring respect for an arbitration agreement
while keeping court involvement to a minimum. It forces the
claimant to go to arbitration, or at least is a major incentive, because
the latter will have no other forum in which to bring his claim. 200
Thirdly, pro-arbitration agreements threaten the principle of
competence-competence, in that arbitrators could feel inhibited to
reach a decision different from that of a national court that has
compelled the arbitration. 201 The assumption is that if a court has

196. Id. at 352.
197. Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 9, ¶ 4 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.
gov.uk/Acts/acts1996/plain/ ukpga_19960023_en_1 (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
198. Id. § 2, ¶ 2(a).
199. Channel Tunnel, [1993] A.C. at 367-68 (determining that the parties’
choice of arbitration to resolve their disputes outweighed the need to protect the
party seeking an injunction).
200. See JEAN-FRANCOIS POUDRET & SEBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION para. 497 (Stephen V. Berti & Annette Ponti
trans., 2d ed. 2007) (“English law is peculiar because the court can neither declare
itself incompetent nor refer the parties to arbitration, but can only stay its
proceedings. It is thus essentially by generalising the mandatory character of the
stay and leaving aside the additional requirement of the existence of a dispute that
the Arbitration Act 1996 has reinforced respect of the arbitration agreement . . . .”).
201. See William W. Park, Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction: Allocation of
Tasks Between Courts and Arbitrators, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 133, 144-45 (1997)
(claiming that government interference with arbitration means that arbitrators
cannot determine their own jurisdiction).
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issued a pro-arbitration order it will have satisfied itself that there is a
valid arbitration agreement. This of course is not the case: rather it is
still for the arbitral tribunal to make the primary decision on
jurisdiction.
Fourthly, pro-arbitration injunctions threaten the sanctity of party
autonomy in that parties agree to go to arbitration on the basis that
the party who believes itself to have been wronged initiates the
arbitral process. The arbitral agreement is not founded on the power
of the courts to force a recalcitrant party to settle its disputes through
arbitration. 202
2. How Far Should Such Orders Reach: To Include Third Parties
Allegedly Covered by the Arbitration Agreement?
If courts are prepared to compel parties to arbitrate their disputes,
where does the process stop? Are courts justified in compelling a
party who is not an express or named party to the arbitration clause
to abide by the arbitration agreement, solely on the basis of closeness
of relationship to one of the main parties to the arbitration or on
account of some other factor? This of course is the controversial
issue of companies and entities which are the alter egos of the state.
This issue is increasingly raised, and many consider that it should be
determined by the arbitrators rather than a national court. 203
The courts appear to have a mixed approach to this issue. Two
recent English cases reached opposite conclusions. In UK Film
Finance Inc. v. Royal Bank of Scotland, an arbitration agreement was
directed at only two of three parties, and the English court extended
the scope of the agreement to cover all three. 204 However, in
Starlight Shipping Co. v. Tai Ping Insurance Co., the English court
found that it had no jurisdiction to grant an order in favor of the ship
manager

202. Cf. Linda R. Boyle, Note, Three’s Company: Examining the Third-Party
Problem through an Analysis of Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Government of Turkmenistan,
45 HOUS. L. REV. 261, 262 (2008) (stating that the power for an arbitration tribunal
stems from agreement between the parties).
203. See id. at 262 (arguing that arbitrators should be able to make jurisdictional
decisions regarding third parties).
204. [2007] EWHC (Comm) 195, [48] (Eng.).
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despite the proceedings being vexatious and oppressive as a matter of
English law. 205
In the United States, courts have relied on the principle of estoppel
to read an arbitration agreement as covering parties who are not
ostensibly party to that agreement. 206 However, in 2007, in Regent
Seven Seas Cruises, Inc. v. Rolls Royce, PLC, a federal judge in
Miami refused to extend an arbitration agreement in a charter
agreement to parties to the related shipbuilding contract. 207 Regent
and Radisson had entered into a time charter agreement containing
an arbitration clause. Regent was the owner of the vessel. It claimed
that Rolls Royce and Alstom “defrauded and deceived” it into
installing the Mermaid pod propulsion system. 208 These parties
requested that the court compel Regent to arbitrate the dispute based
on the charter agreement. U.S. Judge Paul C. Huck of the Southern
District of Florida found that the petitioners could not enforce the
time-charter’s arbitration clause because “[i]t is inconceivable that,
as non-signatories, they would be able to compel Regent to arbitrate
claims that do not even appear to arise out of the Time Charter
agreement.” 209
The São Paulo Court of Appeal held that a controlling shareholder
was bound by an arbitration agreement included in a contract to
which it was not expressly a party, given that there was sufficient
evidence of its inherent connection to the legal relationship. 210 Some
commentators have gone further than the São Paulo Court and
argued for extension when the same economic or operational purpose
can be identified. 211 This is a complicated and controversial area and
205. [2007] EWHC (Comm) 1893, [42] (Eng.).
206. See Regent Seven Seas Cruises, Inc. v. Rolls Royce, PLC, Nos. 06-22347CIV & 06-22539-CIV, 2007 WL 601992, at *7-8 (S. D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2007).
207. Id. at *11-12.
208. Id. at *1.
209. Non-Signatories Not Bound to Arbitrate, Florida Judge Rules, MEALEY’S
INT’L ARB. REP., Mar. 2007, at 7, 7-8.
210. See Paul E. Mason & Mauricio Gomm-Santos, New Keys to Arbitration in
Latin America, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 31, 59-60 (2008) (citing Trelleborg do Brasil Ltd.
v. Anel Empreendimentos Participacoes e Agropecuaria Ltd. (citation omitted));
see also the French CA Paris case of November 30, 1988 Korsnas Marma v.
Durand-Auzias.
211. See, e.g., Olagoke O. Olatawura, The “Privy to Arbitration” Doctrine: The
Withering of the Common-Law Privity of Contract Doctrine in Arbitration Law, 16
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 429, 460 (2005).
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each case can only be discussed on its merits. The real question is
who properly should decide what was agreed, and who does it bind:
a national court selected by the party wishing to achieve a particular
result or the arbitration mechanism selected by the parties?
The main justification for courts to interfere with arbitration in this
way is to save costs and time, to ease the administrative burden, and
to allow for an efficient settlement of disputes, including consistency
of decision making. 212 Although, these objectives are worthy, it is
essential that the arbitral process remain autonomous, and it is for
arbitrators to decide who the proper parties are and whether third
parties were properly covered by this arbitration agreement.
There is a danger that pro-arbitration injunctions will not reach
their target because they will not be respected by another court. 213
There also exists the possibility that one injunction leads to a battle
of injunctions. 214 For example, in Dependable Highway Express, Inc.
v. Navigators Insurance Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit recently considered the situation where Navigators had
obtained an injunction from the English courts forbidding
Dependable from proceeding with litigation in U.S. courts in relation
to an indemnity contract. 215 The Ninth Circuit found that it was not
necessary to recognize the English injunction because its sole
purpose was to interfere with the U.S. suit. The court stated:
Indeed, “there are limitations to the application of comity.
When the foreign act is inherently inconsistent with the
policies underlying comity, domestic recognition could tend
either to legitimize the aberration or to encourage retaliation,
undercutting the realization of the goals served by comity. No
nation is under an unremitting obligation to enforce foreign

212. Cf. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the
Making of Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1189, 1206 (2003)
(emphasizing economy, efficiency, and effectiveness as objectives of dispute
resolution).
213. See, e.g., Dependable Highway Express, Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498
F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2007).
214. See, e.g., Comandate Marine Corp. v. Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd.
(2006) FCAFC 192, ¶¶ 16-20 (Austl.).
215. Dependable, 498 F.3d at 1062.
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interests which are fundamentally prejudicial to those of the
domestic forum.” 216
3. What Other Options are There to Compel Arbitration
Other than by Injunction?
Can a party forced to go to court to claim damages for breach of
contract, that is, failure to arbitrate? This would include the cost of
preventing any court proceedings. The initial difficulty with this
argument is that it could be applied to any claim in damages. Is there
something different in arbitration that, unlike other forms of
contractual breach, the costs should not be treated as costs in the
litigation? Is the fact that the agreement was to resolve a dispute in a
certain way a justification for a separate damages claim?
In England, courts have held that a failure to abide by a dispute
resolution clause can sound in damages. In Union Discount Co. v.
Zoller, the English Court of Appeal found that there was no objection
to a claim for damages based on a breach of contract. Union and
Zoller were parties to a series of contracts, each of which contained a
jurisdiction clause. In 2001, Union commenced proceedings in
England against Zoller for sums due under the contracts. Zoller
initiated proceedings in New York. Union successfully applied to
strike out the New York proceedings as being in breach of the
exclusive jurisdiction clause. It was common ground that Union did
not ask the New York court for its costs of that application, since
under New York law they were not recoverable. In the English
proceedings, Union added a claim to recover the costs of the New
York proceedings as damages for breach of contract. 217
This was recently revisited in A v. B, where there was an
agreement between parties and an arbitrator to settle existing
disputes by arbitration in Switzerland and under Swiss law. 218 One
party unsuccessfully brought proceedings in the English courts for an
anti-arbitration injunction against the arbitrator and the other parties.
On the question of whether the successful party was entitled to
216. Id. at 1067 (quoting Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines,
731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
217. Union Discount Co. v. Zoller, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1755, [31] (Eng.).
218. A v. B, [2007] EWHC (Comm) 54, [16]-[17] (Eng.).

2009]

NATIONAL COURT INVOLVEMENT

535

recover indemnity costs, i.e., more than the normal amount of costs
allowed under the English system for taxation of costs, the English
court stated that, provided that it could be established that the other
party was in breach of the arbitration or jurisdiction clause and that
the breach had caused the innocent party reasonably to incur legal
costs, those costs should normally be recoverable on an indemnity
basis. 219
An interesting question is who should determine this damages
question: the court where anti-arbitration proceedings are brought or
the arbitration tribunal that has jurisdiction? This author suggests it
should be the latter that determines damages.

CONCLUSIONS
In relation to the question of whether national court involvement
undermines the arbitral process, the answer is that it depends on the
nature and circumstances of the involvement. In this respect, it must
be remembered that national courts operate in different legal and
cultural contexts: there are common law and civil law jurisdictions;
developing and developed countries; legal systems with or without
political or religious influences. The way that each national court
views its relationship to international arbitration is inevitably colored
by these factors. 220
However, notwithstanding the above, there are a number of
principles that ought to inform the way in which national courts
approach the issue of their involvement with international arbitration.
First, despite its autonomous character, international arbitration
depends on national courts to provide effectiveness, support, and
assistance for the process. Second, international arbitration does not
depend on national courts for legitimacy; this exists as of right, based
on the agreement of the parties, the New York Convention, and

219. See id. [54]; see also Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC v. Rabobank Nederland,
[2007] EWHC (Comm) 1742, [36] (Eng.); Scandinavian Airlines Sys. Den.-Nor.Swed. v. Sunrock Aircraft Corp., [2007] EWCA (Civ) 882, [37]-[42] (Eng.). On
the issue of damages for breach of arbitration clauses, see generally Justin
Michealson & Gordon Blanke, Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Recoverability of
Legal Costs as Damages for Breach of an Arbitration Agreement, 74 INT’L J. ARB.,
MEDIATION & DISPUTE MGMT. 12 (2008).
220. Carbonneau, supra note 213, at 1193-94.
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international arbitration practice. 221 Third, accordingly, national
courts should become involved where they are asked to give effect to
the agreement to arbitrate and support the process agreed between
the parties, including by assisting with the establishment of the
tribunal, the protection and collection of evidence for use in the
arbitration, and, if need be, preservation of the status quo. Fourth,
once an award has been made, courts should seek to give effect to the
tribunal’s award because it is a recognition of the autonomous
character of arbitration, an implied agreement of the parties to honor
the award of the arbitrators and the New York Convention—which
of course contains the exceptions to the general rule. 222
Fifth, with respect to injunctions, all injunctions have the capacity
to be abused and used as vehicles for mischief making. If an
injunction fails to reach its target, it will not be respected by another
court and could be a source of a second litigious front, which the
parties no doubt would have wished to avoid. There also exists the
possibility that one injunction leads to a battle of injunctions. Antisuit injunctions, which aim to restrain a party from resorting to a
national court, are often justified. They support the arbitration
process by directing parties to the forum chosen by the parties to
determine their differences. The main focus in deciding whether to
grant an injunction ought to be the parties’ agreement to settle their
dispute by arbitration rather than issues of oppression or fairness or
any broader effects of the decision on matters of comity. These
injunctions ought to be granted only by the seat of the arbitration and
prior to an award’s being granted. The tribunal can then, as it is
authorized and in accordance with the competence-competence
doctrine, determine its own jurisdiction.
Most abusive are the anti-arbitration injunctions. Although these
are rare, they are often applied for with the specific intention of
undermining the arbitration process. Here again this is not a matter
for a court: if there is some reason the arbitration cannot or should
not proceed, this should be determined by the method chosen by the
parties, i.e., an arbitration tribunal. Pro-arbitration orders may well
stem from good intentions, but they run the risk of undermining the
arbitration process by failing to recognize the self-correcting
221. New York Convention, supra note 10, art. I.
222. Id., art. V.
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measures built into the arbitration system. 223 An over-zealous court is
in clear danger of trespassing on the domain of the arbitral tribunal
and/or pre-empting the decision of such a tribunal. The safest course
is for the national court to content itself with offering passive support
and recognition.
Further, national courts should take a hands-off approach when
parties have agreed on arbitration because there is an inevitable
parochialism in every national court—no matter how strongly it
avows an internationalist perspective. Every international arbitration
gives rise to a unique blend of legal perspectives that derive from the
various backgrounds of the participating lawyers, arbitrators, and
parties. 224 A national court asked to intervene cannot possibly fully
take account of these perspectives in reaching its decisions. The
same cannot be said of the arbitrators who are intimately involved in
the arbitration and are therefore well (or at least much better) placed
to understand its every nuance. As a matter of practical wisdom,
matters are very often best left to them to decide.
However, it is also the case that arbitrators and parties must give
national courts due respect because it is the national courts that
ultimately hold the keys to recognition and enforcement. To return to
the analogy used earlier, if national courts refuse to provide the
nourishment and sustenance sought at the right time and in the right
place, the giant squid of international arbitration might be forced into
shallower waters, where it will inevitably find itself in peril.

223. See Park, supra note 202, at 140-42.
224. See Boyle, supra note 203, at 264.

